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About  20 percent  of the total production  of  percent  of production  and most of the tropical
tropical  timber is traded  internationally.  But for  timber is imported  in Asia, where such restric-
Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Papua New Guinea,  and  tions currently  do not exist.  Even if import
some  countries  in West-Central  Africa,  tropical  restrictions  had a significant  impact,  it would  be
timber trade accounts  for more than 50 percent  in a reduction  in value of tropical  logs that would
of production.  make alternative  uses of the forest lands more
profitable  - so the rate of deforestation  might
Although  the tropical  timber trade has often  not be reduced.
been blamed  for deforestation,  Varangis,  Primo
Braga,  and Takeuchi  find that it contributes  Eco-labeling's  main strength  is its capacity
much  less to deforstation than  do poor policies  to discriminate  (through  market signals)  in favor
for the production  of tropical  timber.  Lack of  of timber  produced  under sound  environmental
tenure rights, short  and uncertain  logging  con-  practices.  By contrast,  bans and boycotts  have  an
cessions,  low stumpage  values,  and inadequate  indiscriminate,  perverse  impact.
monitoring  of logging  activities  are among  the
major  policy failures  that help  deplete  the  But if eco-labeling  is imposed  unilaterally  by
tropical  forests.  a subset  of countries,  its effectiveness  will be
doubtful.  It will lead to trade  diversion  and
Trade policies,  often  identified  as an instnr-  potentially  perverse  environmental  results,  not to
ment for enforcing  environmental  objectives  mention  an increase  in GAIT trade  disputes.
intemationally,  are inefficient  instruments  for  Even  if eco-labeling  is adopted  by all importing
correcting  domestic  distortions,  and in the case  countries,  there  could still be trade diversion  in
of tropical  timber  trade, may affect the environ-  tropical  timber  products because  some consum-
ment perversely.  ers may not prefer certified  timber, given  its
higher  price.
Export and import restrictions  ultimately
depress  the value  of an already  underpriced  Eco-labeling  programs  should  be designed
resource  - the forest. Restrictions  on log  so that producers  see them not as a nontariff
exports, for example,  encourage  wasteful  pro-  barrier but as an instrument  for capturing  the
cessing  of logs. Unless  sound  forest management  rents associated  with prevailing  environmental
policies  are enforced  domestically,  the net  effect  concerns  in the developed  world. Consumer
could  evea be an increase  in the rate of defores-  education  is important  to the success  of such
tation.  programs,  and eco-labeling  programs  ehould  be
designed  accordingly.
Import  restrictions  may  have a marginal
impact,  since  trade accounts  for less than 20
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The protection  of the physical  environment  is considered  an essential  component  of economic
development  policies  geared  to fight  poverty  and promote  economic  growth. However,  the impact  of
international  trade  on the environment  remains  one  of the most  divisive  issues  in the interaction  between
economics  and ecology. One  can rationalize  the anti-trade  bias of some  environmentalists  as one facet
of their belief  that economic  growth  sooner  or later will bring  environmental  degradation.  There are,
of course,  exceptions  to this characterization.  Some  environmentalists,  for example,  have  argued  that
international  trade could  help "extractivism"  become  a sound  alternative  to the exploitation  of tropical
forests,  on both  economic  and  ecological  grounds.  Analyses  of the economic  and  ecological  "advantages'
of extractivism  can be found,  for example,  in Peters, Gentry,  and Mendelsohn  (1989)  and Pearnside
(1990). We  would  note,  however,  that  the economic  feasibility  of large-scale  extractivism  is  difficult  and
may  be, in some  cases, questionable,  given  the limited  size of markets  for these  products  (mainly  non-
wood  forest  products,  such  as medicinal  plants,  latex,  essences  and oils and edible  fruits).
Those  environmentalists  whose  attitude  towards  international  trade  is  dominated  by the  perception
that it will lead to environmental  degradation  tend to support trade restrictions  in the pursuit of
environmental  protection. By the same  token,  they  tend  to distrust  the "neoliberal"  trade  system  built
around  the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade (GATT),  which  supports  trade liberalization  and
market-oriented  trade policies.  The large potential  for conflict  between GATT's disciplines  and
environmental  concernj  is manifested  by a number  of trade  policies  that  have  an impact  on tropical  timber
trade. Further,  calls  for limiting  or banning  tropical  timber  imports  from countries  that are deemed  to
have  unsustainable  forest  management  have  multiplied  in OECD  countries  lately.
The authors  would  like  to thank  Ron Duncen,  Vikram  Nehru,  and Arnoldo  Contreras  for valuable
comments  and suggestions.  Some  of the points  about  eco-labeling  are due to Rachel  Crossley.a
Ilsi  paper focuses  on the potential  effects  of various  trade policies, and in particular  eco-labeling,
on the depletion  of tropical moist forests.  The paper is structured as follows: first, some statistics are
provided  to show the level of forest resources  and the estimated  rate of depletion  of tropical moist  forests.
Second, a brief analysis  follows on the causes of depletion. Given the large number  of existing  studies,
these first two topics are discussed only briefly, sufficient to set the stage for the analysis  that follows.
Third, the importance  of tropical timber trade in developing  countries' exports, the ratio of exports to
production, and recent trends in these are analyzed. Next, the environmental  impact of trade policies
affecting tropical timber is discussed.  Eco-labeling  practices with regard to tropica1l  timber products
receive special attention in this context.  The paper ends with a summary of its conclusions  and some
policy recommendations.
Forest Resources and Rates of DeDletion
Tropical moist  forests  cover an area of about 1.5 billion hectares, corresponding  to approximately
42% of the world's forest area.  Of these, 655 million hectares ar.  tropical rain forest - which is
equivalent  to over three times the size of the European  Community  (200 million  ha.).  Fifteen developing
countries account for about 1.0 billion hectares of closed  tropical forest. The largest  tropical forests are
located in Brazil, Indonesia, and West-Central Africa (Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon and
Zaire).  The last-mentioned  area has the largest forest area (tropical  and non-tropic)  per capita in the
world.Estimates  of the rates of tropical forest depletion  are hotly debated.  The estimates  range from
14 to 20 million  hectares of tropical  forest per year (refer to World Resources  Institute, 1990; Postel and
Ryan, 1991). In 1992, FAO gave an estimate  of 16.9 million  hectares per year for the period 1981-90  -
- equivalent  to 0.9% p.a. of the total tropical moist forest area.  Analysts  point to the fact that these rates
have increased  over time.  For example,  in 1988  FAO had estimated  a rate of 11.4 million  hectares per
year for the early 1980s. As already mentioned,  however, these rates are subject to controversy. One
of the reasons for the controversy  is the method most commonly used in obtaining these rates.  This
method relies on information provided by the thermal range of a  high resolution radiometer in  a
meteorological  satellite.  The accuracy of this technique  has been criticized because of the imprecie
correlation  between fire and new tropical forest clearing (most of the fires occur in regions where the
forest is already cleared)  and to the fact that the sensibility  of the sensor tends to magnify  the area under
fire (Fearnside, 1989). Primo Braga (1992, p.  175)  describes the debate over a high estimate  for Brazil
of 8 million  ha/year obtained by this method in 1987; a more accurate  figure would have been closer to
2.3-2.6 million  hectares.
Forest depletion  has already affected  the economies  of a number of developing  countries
involved  in tropical timber trade.  The Philippines,  for example,  shifted from being a large net exporter
of tropica. timber in the 1960s  and 1970s  to a net importer  during the 1980s. While methods  of national
accounting  for natural resources are still being  refined and estimates  are hard to come by, an estimate  of
almost US$50 billion (in constant 1985 dollars) has been derived as the cost of forest depletion in
Indonesia,  Papua New Guinea,  and the Philippines  during the period 1980-85  (World  Bank, 1992c);  (for
a discussion of the natural resource accounting  methodology  see Repetto, eL.  al.,  1989).  There are
estimates that if the tropical forest depletion rates of the mid-1980s are maintained in the 1990s, the
number of net exporters of tropical timber will fall from 33 to less than 10 by the end of the century
(World Resources Institute, 1985).However, the arguments  that tropical rain forests will be totally depleted  in 20, 30, or even 40
years are farfe  . hed.  On the basis of a linear projection  of the recent FAO estimates  of depletion  rates,
it would take more than 100 years to clear the entire tropical rain forests, without  allowing  for protected
or inaccessible  forests. Environmentalists  criticize  such projections  by pointing  out that they do not take
into account "forest degradation".  This is said to follow from the conversion  of closed to oDen  forest,
negatively  affecting  the site and lowering  the production  capacity  of the forest (Tropical l7mbers,  1992).
Economists, in turn, are ready to argue that a "Malthusian"  scenario is unlikely since signs of timber
scarcity would foster better conservation  practices.
Causes of Tropical  Forest Depletion
The direct causes of tropical  forest depletion  are well analyzed  and documented. Land clearing
for agricultural production and cattle ranching, commercial  logging, and demand for fuelwood are the
main factors contributing  to tropical forest depletion.  Estimates  of the contribution of each of these
factors are very rough.  Johnson (1991) suggests that 64% can be attributed to agriculture, 18% to
commercial  logging, 10% to fuelwood  gatherers, and 8% to cattle ranching. The World Bank (1991)
attributes 60% to  agriculture with the balance split roughly between logging and other uses (road
construction,  urbanization,  fuelwood, etc.).  However, these shares do not capture well the dynamics  of
forest depletion, which usually involves the interaction of different economic activities.  Logging
operations, for example,  tend to facilitate  access to forest areas and this may foster agricultural  uses.
Divergence between public and private costs and benefits is the central economic  problem of
forestry use.  Virtually all environmental concerns can be  thought of  in  the  form of  economic
externalities. Erosion from cleared  hil:slopes, excessive  releases of carbon dioxide from land-clearing
fires, and losses of biodiversity  result f  undervaluation  of the forest and its products.  These cost5
externalities  exist because  of inefficient  markets  resulting  from imperfectly  defined  or non-existent
property  rights. The magnitude  of these  externalities  variw  from  country  to country  and  one  should  bear
in mind  the  methodological  difficulties  in assessing  such  costs. Hodgson  and  Dixon  (1988)  estimated  that
in the Philippines  uncontrolled  logging  of about  8,000  ha of watershed  area resulted  in social  costs  of
more  than  US$43  million,  mainly  because  of damage  caused  to fishing  and tourism  activities.  In Java,
Indonesia,  the cost of soil erosion  from degraded  upland  forests and rainfed agricultural  land, may
amount  to US$75  million  p.a. (World  Bank, 1992c).
Perhaps  the most  pervasive  reason  for the  divergence  betweeni  private  and  social  costs  and  benefits
in forestry  use is the absence  of clear and enforceable  property  rights. When  property  rights  are non.-
existent  or unenforced,  no individual  bears  the full costs  of any environmental  df;gradation  and  there  is
no mechanism  for regulating  the  use of the  resource. The  result  is over-exploitation,  or what  is  generally
known  as the 'tragedy of the commons." Clarifying  rights  of ownership  and use generally  improves
environmental  outcomes. For ;xample,  in Thailand,  the recent  assignment  of ownership  titles and
tenurial  rights  to land  has made  it more  profitable  for farmers  to invest  in soil conservation  and land
improvement,  thus reducing  soil erosion  (World  Bank, 1992b). It is also worth noting  that in most
developing  countries  forest  lands  are under  state  ownership  and control  (notable  exceptions  are Papua
New  Guinea  and the Pacific  Island  where  clans  hold forest  ownership). Moreover,  forestry  agencies
usually  have not been mandated  to involve  local people  in either  the management  of or the benefits
flowing  from the forest  resources. In most  cases,  they attempt  to administer  forests  as a raw material
source  for large industries. As a consequence,  the rate of log extraction  is rapidly  increasing  and log
processing  capacity  expanding.  Noteworthy  is the manifestation  of conflicts  over the tenure  rights  and
the involvement  of local  people  in the benefits  flowing  from forest  resources,  as illustrated  by the 1987
incident  involving  the Penan  people  of Sarawak  who  set up roadblocks  and  halted  logging  because  their
livelihood  derived  from  the forest  was threatened.Central to the issue of diverging public and private cost  is the issue of low rents from logging
aMtivities  captured by the governments in tropical timber producing countries.  Economists measure
timber scarcity in terms of the rate of growth of the stumpage value, i.e.,  the difference between log
prices and logging costs.  In other words, the stumpage value is the market value of standing trees.
Stumpage  values  have been rising in real terms (Vincent, 1992). Hov%  'ver, the rate of increase has been
steadily diminishing, indicating  that scarcity is slackening (Sedjo and Lyon,  1990).  Vincent (1992)
reports that forecasting models  predict that stumpage  values and tropical  timber prices will be increasing
more slowly in the future.  This implies that, from a purely financial point of view, tropical timber
producing countries  should irncrease  the harve3t rate, i.e., "cash in  the stumpage  value and invest it in
sectors or projects that earn higher rates of return.
This situation is made worse by government policies related to  tropical timber concessions
encountered in almost every tropical timber exporting country. As already noted, in most of these
countries forests are government-owned. Harvesting of logs is carried out most:y by private parties
receiving t;mber concessions.  Generally, the fees the governments levy on  timber extracted by
concessions  bear no relation to stumpage  values.  They are set arbitrarily and account for only a small
fraction of stumpage  values. By doing this, the social  value of a forest is reduced, favoring  its conversion
to other uses that yield greater tax revenues  for the government. In addition, low concession  fees imply
low levels of funding  for forest management. Vincent  (1992)  points out that "the lack of funds for forest
management in many tropical producing countries results not so ruch  from low international  timber
prices as from the failure of govermments  to capture the existing  stumpage  value".  Concessionaires  also
have little incentive  to invest in forests or improve management  practices, because the duration of their
concession contracts is typically short and of uncertain duration.  Other major consequences  of low
stumpage  fees have been strong political  pressure to open forests for logging, and areas and species  have
been logged  which would have been ignored  in a less profitable  environment.z
The usual policies  recommended  to address  these  problems  are either: (i) to maintain  government
ownership and the existing system of concession contracts but increase concession fees to amounts
sufficient for financing  forest management,  or (ii) allow concessicnaires  to continue  paying the low fees
but increase the length of the contracts, making  them renev.wable  and transferable  and thus creating an
asset value.  In an extreme case, forests may be privatized (as has happened in Chile).  Related  to the
second policy recommendation,  Paris and Ruziska  (1991)  suggest that loggers shou:d  be given the rights
to a specified area for a certain period of time in exchange for a forestry guarantee  bond.  This bond
should be deposited for the lease period and forfeited to the government if the logger breaks the
conditions  of the lease, that would include an obligation  to protect parts of the forest.  These two sts  of
policies may have quite different implications  for the distribution  of wealth from harvesting  a country's
tropical forests.  However, it  is important to link timber scarcity signals with forest management
responses  and in the process assign  the forests their true value. The role that trade policies may play in
this process is discussed later.
Another issue contributing  to the problem of tropical forest depletion  is the lack of significant
forestry research.  Forestry research, the scientific basis for management of tropical forests is only
beginning  to be developed. It has lagged  behind agricultural  research and adoption  of new management
practices has been slow. Forestry research expenditure  in tropical timber producing countries is only a
very small fraction of the value of timber products (for India less than 0.01% according to the World
Bank, 1992c).E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  A 
Some Facts about Tr&ical 7lmber Trade
Production  of tropical  timber  is roughly  only  14-15%  of the total  production  of timber  (softwood
and  hardwood).  Moreover,  the growth  rate  of global  production  and  consumption  of tropical  timber  has
been  slowing. The rate  of growth  of production  during  the 1960-10  period  was  5.6% p.a. but it fell to
1.5%  p.a. during the period 1980-90. Table 1 shows  a rapid increase  in production  of industrial
roundwood  and  processed  wood  products  in almost  every  geograplhic  region  during  the 1960s  and 1970s
and then a considerable  reduction  in production  growth  during  the 1980s. A notable  exception  is the
production  of wood-based  panels,  in particular  plywood  manufactured  in Asia,  which  continued  to grow
rapidly  in the 1980s.
Trade in tropical  timber  products  has frequently  been  blamed  for the disappearance  of tropical
forests. However,  this allegation  does not hold up well when  trade statistics  are examined. Table  2
shows  that  in the case  of industrial  roundwood  Oogs  and pulpwood)  and sawnwood,  exports
account  for about 11  % of the production. There is a much  higher  percentage,  59%, for wood-based
panels. For wood  pulp  and paper  and  paperboard,  exports  account  for 23% and 13%  respectively.  All
told,  exports  of tropical  timber  products  account  for, at most,  20%  of tropical  timber  production.  If one
refers  to values  instead  of volumes,  the percentage  of the value  of trade in the value of production  is
somewhat  higher  than  20%, since  the  more  valuable  logs  tena  to be exported.  Thus,  most  tropical  timber
is consumed  in developing  countries  and  not in developed  countries.  Developing  countries  also account
for most  of the increase  in tropical  timber  consumption  that  has occurred  recently  and is forecasted  in
economic  models  (Vincent,  1992).  Also  noteworthy  is the quantity  of imports  of temperate  and  softwood
(coniferous)  timber  products  by developing  countries.Table 1.  Production  of Wood Products, by Region, 1961 to 1990
1961  1970  1980  1990
Product/Region  (in 1,000 cubic meters)
Industrial  Roundwood  (NC)
Afiica  18,632  26,989  34,493  38,604
Latin America  20,995  2E,457  54,735  63,771
Asia  21,606  47,690  101,617  118,459
Other Developing  7,113  8,970  9,953  11,407
Developing  68,346  112,106  200,798  232,241
World  264,168  365,887  459,517  516,025
Sawnwood  (NC)
Africa  1,816  2,612  5,169  5,780
Latin America  6,273  8,621  13,708  17,063
Asia  4,295  7,092  27,004  37,504
Other Developing  346  812  1,414  1,986
Developing  12,730  19,137  47,295  A2.333
World  73,367  93,087  113,671  121,621
Wood-based  Panels
Africa  155  523  1,096  1,422
Latin America  648  2,056  4,221  5,034
Asia  104  1,079  5,678  14,461
Other Developing  80  358  684  1,259
Developing  987  4,016  11,679  22,176
World  31,539  69,763  101,030  124,939
Source: FAO, Forest Products Yearbook  (various issues).
Notes:  1.  Industrial roundwood  and sawnwood  refer to non-coniferous  (NC) timbers. Non-coniferous
timbers include  temperate  and tropical  woods, however, the majority  of developing  countries  are
tropical timber producers.  Wood-based  panels are both coniferous  and non-coniferous.
2.  Asia, excludes China.  China is included  in the World total. China is excluded from Asia
because it is a large producer and lies in the temperate zone.
3.  Other Developing  includes  the Near East and Oceania.lo
Table 2:  Production  and Trade of Wood Products in Developing  Countries, 1990.
Apparent
Product  Production  Exports  Imports  Consumption
--------------- (in 1,000 cubic meters)--------  -
Industrial  Roundwood  300,196  33,860  14,881  281,217
Sawnwood  89,603  10,758  11,163  90,008
Wood-based  Panels  22,176  13,078  4,593  13,691
------------------- (in  1,000 metric tons)---  --
J Pulp  8,977  2,020  2,908  9,865
aper and Paperboard  22,036  2,865  7,891  27,062
Source: FAO, Forest Products Yearbook  (various issues).
Notes:  1. Industrial roundwood  consists  of logs and pulpwood.
2.  Wood-based  panels are mainly veneer and plywood, but also include particle board and
fiberboard.
3. China is excluded from the Developing  Region because it is a large producer and lies in the
temperate zone.
For the two major tropical  timber exporters, Malaysia  and Indonesia,  trade accounts  for a large part of
their production. Data for 1990  show that in Malaysia  exports of logs and timber products accounted  for
about 75% of timber production, while for Indonesia 60% of timber production was exported.  Other
countries  with high export shares are: Congo (62%), COte  d'Ivoire (57%), Gabon (78%), Ghana (49%),
Liberia (64%), and Papua New Guinea  (83%). Thus, while in aggregate,  trade in tropical  timber cannot
be held primarily responsible  for the disappearance  of tropical forests, for several countries it may be
argued that it has been an important  factor in the process.
Table 3 shows that in 1990 most (82.2%) of the exports of tropical  timber originated  from Asia,
particularly from Malaysia and Indonesia. These two countries account for about two-thirds of worldtropical timber exports.  Using 1987  data (see Table 3), Asia is also the largest importer (54.3%), with
China, Japan and South Korea accounting  for a little less than half of total tropical  timber imports. These
statistics show that the dominant pattern in tropical timber trade is from Southeast Asian producing
regions to East Asian import markets.
In terms of  value, tropical timber trade accounted for  1.6% of the total value of  non-oil
merchandise  exports of developing countries in 1990 (Table 4).  This percentage  is slightly lower than
in 1980 (2%).  However, while  in the 1960s  and 1970s  processed products accounted  for about 40% of
the total value of timber exports, in the 1980s  they accounted  for about 80% (Table 4).  The biggest
increases have been registered in wood-based  panels and paper and paperboard products.  For some
developing  countries,  timber exports  are quite important. These countries  are (inside  parenthesis:  tropical
timber exports as a percent of total export  revenues  in 1990):  Central African  Republic (31  %), Myanmar
(28%), COte  d'Ivoire (15%), Malaysia  (13%), Papua New Guinea (9%), Guinea-Bissau  (9%), Gabon
(9%), Cameroon (8%), Indonesia  (7%), Liberia (7%), and Ghana (7%).
Another pattern that emerged in tropical timber trade in the 1980s  was the reduction in imports
of tropical logs and sawnwood by developed countries and, in parallel, an increase in the imports of
temperate logs and sawnwood  (World  Bank, 1992a).  Table 5 shows the trend in tropical and temperate
logs and sawnwood  timber imports  in Europe (Western and Eastern).  A similar trend is developing  in
Japan, where tropical log imports fell from 22,715 thousand cubic meters in  1979 to 9,600 thousand
cubic meters in 1992. Tropical sawnwood  imports  by Japan, while increasing in the 1970s  and early1a
Table 3:  Shares of Major Exporters and Importers  in Tropical Timber Trade
Major Exporters  Share of  b/  Major Importers  Share of
Countries/Region  Exports (%)  Countries/Regions  Imports (%)
1990  1987
Countrie
Malaysia  41.5  (10.6)  Japan  28.1
Indonesia  23.8  (13.8)  China  9.2
Singapore  a/  4.6  - USA  7.5
Brazil  3.3  (19.6)  South Korea  6.2
COte  d'Ivoire  2.1  (1.4)  Singapore  a/  6.2
Congo  1.4  (0.8)  United  Kingdom  4.7
Gabon  1.4  (0.6)  Hong Kong a/  4.2
Regions
Asia  82.2  (52.6)  Asia  54.3
Latin America  5.4  (26.8)  EC  20.1
Africa  8.8  (17.9)
Sources: World Bank, International  Trade Division;  German Bundestag  (1990);
Zarsky (1991).
Notes: Timber trade in sawnwood, wood-based  panels, (converted  in roundwood  equivalent)  and logs.
a/  Transit country.
b/  Inside the parentheses  are the world production  shares of each of the exporters, in 1990.
Table 4:  Developing  Countries' Export Revenues  from Wood Products, 1961 to 1990 a/
1961  1970  1980  1990
--  (in 1990  million constant  US$)
Logs  1378  3186  5606  2,352
Sawnwood  774  1232  3045  2,406
Wood-based  Panels  143  682  1775  4,175
Wood Pulp  33  203  889  1,169
Paper & Paperboard  100  132  696  1,969
Total Processed Products  1050  2249  6405  9719
Total Wood Products  2428  5435  12011  12,071
Share of Total non-oil
Merchandise  Exports (%)  NA  NA  2.0  1.6
Source:  FAO, Forest Products Yearbook (various issues) and the World Bank, International Trade
Division.
a/  China is excluded.13
Table  5:  European  Imports  of Tropical  and  Temperate  Logs  and Sawnwood;  1984-92a/
1984  1985  1987  1989  1990  1991  1992
--- (in  1,000  cubic  meters)
Tropical
Logs  4012  3621  3244  3551  3558  3295  3196
Sawnwood  2837  2974  3841  3757  3166  2660  2610
Temperate
Logs  2727  2803  2930  3385  4365  4195  4200
Sawnwood  2521  2412  2724  3001  4023  5884  3903
Source:  Timber  Bulletin (various issues), United Nations Economic  Commission  for Europe.
a/ Europe includes  both Eastern and Western.
1980s, fell from 1,736 thousand cubic meters in 1989 to about 1,200 thousand cubic meters in 1992.
Japan  has been  substituting  temperate  and even  softwood  logs  for tropical  logs. During  the  period 1987
to 1991,  tropical  log imports  into Japan  declined  by 15  % while  imhports  of softwood  and  temperate  logs
(mainly  from Chile,  New  Zealand  and  the United  States)  increased  by 12%.
The Role of Trade Policies in Tropical Timber Trade
Expoit  Bans, Other Restrictions, and Taxes.  Such trade policies  are imposed  by producer
countries  to restrict or  eliminate  the export of logs (sometimes  semi-processed  products  as well).
Frequently,  a primary  objective  of such policies  is to stimulate  value-added  processing  and increase
foreign  exchange  earnings  while  reducing  the log content  of timber  product  exports,  although  recently
conservation  objectives  seem  to have  increased  in importance.  Notable  examples  where  such  policies
have  been  undertaken  by governments,  at various  times and for various  durations,  include  most  Latin
American  countries,  the state  of British  Columbia  in Canada,  the state  of  Washington  in the United  States,
as well as several  countries  in southeast  Asia such as Indonesia,  Myanmar,  Philippines,  Peninsular
Malaysia,  Thailand  and more  recently  Cambodia  and  the states  of Sabah  and  Sarawak  (this  list is in no
way intended  to be exhaustive).Ii
By and  large, in most  cases  where  promotion  of value-added  processing  and  exports  has been  the
main objective,  the objective  has been achieved--albeit  in varying  degrees. However,  an important
question  is whether  the benefits  of such  policies  have  been  more  than  enough  to offset  the costs  involved.
Studies  of experience  with  export  restrictions  in Peninsular  Malaysia  and Indonesia  suggest  in fact  that
the cost of export  restrictions  has exceeded  the benefits. For example,  Wiens  (1992)  indicates  that  the
effects  in Peninsular  Malaysia  over  a decade  were  as follows:
"(a)  sawnwood  production  was increased  by 24%  with  the restrictions,  employment  by about
the same  amount,  and log  production  reduced  by 15%, but,
(b)  without  the restrictions,  export  earnings  (logs  and  sawnwood  only)  would  have  been  22%
higher,  economic  value-added  34%  higher,  and resource  rent (from  harvested  logs, and
not  necessarily  captured  by government)  49%  higher  than  their  actual  historical  values.
Comparing  benefits  and costs, each sawmill  job created  by the log-export  restrictions  cost Peninsular
Malaysia  annually  M$16,000  in economic  value-added,  M$44,800  in export  earnings,  and  M$92,000  in
resource  rent. In contrast,  the average  annual  wage  in sawmills  in 1989  was  around  M$6,000"  (Wiens
1992,  p. 8).
Similar  results  are reported  by Vincent  (1992),  again  for Peninsular  Malaysia.
In Indonesia,  in the early 1980s  the government  decided  to phase  out log  exports  by 1985.  One
objective  of this policy  was to stimulate  the growth  of export-oriented  processing. As a result, total
export earnings  from timber and processed  timber exports (including  secondary  processed  timber
products)  rose from $1.2 billion  in 1980  to over $3.6 billion  in 1991 (all values  in current  dollars).
Indonesia  has established  itself  as a major  exporter  of processed  timber  products. In terms  of effects  on
its balance  of trade,  the policy  appears  to have  had a net "benefit".  However,  the log  export  ban policy
had  the effect  of depressing  domestic  log  prices  compared  with  international  prices. For example,  as of
August  1992,  plywood  grade  logs  in local  market Oog  pond  in Samarinda)  were  being  priced  at around
$90-100  per cubic  meters,  as compared  with  the export  log  price  (FOB  Sabah)  of about  $180. This  price
differential  in effect  amounted  to a subsidy  to local  processing  industries,  and should  be counted  on the
cost  side  in any  comprehensive  cost-benefit  analysis  of the  policy. It was  estimated  that  the underpricing
of timber  to local processors,  and the inefficiency  it condones,  amounts  to nearly  US $ 500 millionannually (World Bank, 1992c). The relatively low levels of local prices also may have encouraged
wasteful  use of logs in local processing (e.g., an average wood recovery rate of 50-54% is achieved  in
Indonesian  plywood mills compared with a rate of close to 70% in Japan; Constantino, 1990).
An important  difficulty  with all the studies  is that some of the effects  due to trade restrictions  are
hard to quantify for the calculation  of costs and benefits.  Another problem inherent in such studies is
the difficulty of making counterfactual  projections.  In other words, what would have happened  in the
absence  of such policy actions? This is particularly  a problem  when dealing with suppliers large enough
to affect the market, such as Indonesia  and Malaysia.
If we were to summarize  the experience  from the majority  of the studies, the main effect of trade
restrictions is the undervaluing  of logs in producing  countries. This leads to losses in the value-added,
in export earnings, and in resource rents, and to excess capacity and inefficient production practices.
With regards to the environmental  impact,  export bans and restrictions  lower domestic log prices, giving
the signal of non-scarcity and treating tropical forests as inferior land uses.  The end result could be
greater exploitation  of the forests.
More specifically, the export ban on logs would not decrease the total demand for timber
products;  instead, the flow  of logs would  now  be diverted  from processors  abroad  to domestic  processors,
lowering  the domestic  price of logs, giving domestic  producers a windfall  gain and probably increasing
waste and inefficiency. In such a case, the rate of deforestation  could increase  if the elasticity  of demand16
for logs domestically  is higher than the elasticity of demand for logs abroad.'  (In addition, the capacity
for domestic  processing  should equal the capacity  of the earlier users of logs.)  The rate of deforestation
will also be  affected positively if the waste coefficients in log processing are higher domestically
compared  to earlier users of logs.
Tropical timber countries  have also experimented  with logging  bans.  Examples  can be found in
Thailand  in 1989, the Philippines  since the 1970s, and recently  in the northern  part of Guatemala; while
in 1989 Papua New Guinea put a ban on issuing new logging  concessions. The bans have not curbed
deforestation  significantly. Thailand's logging  ban has increased  the pressure on forests in neighboring
Myanmar  and Laos (Litner, 1992). In the Philippines,  the illegal timber trade has effectively  canceled
out the effects of the ban; and in northern Guatemala  logs are smuggled  across the border into Mexico.
Also, because restrictions  on exports of finished  wood  products are limited, illegally  felled timber is still
exported.  What makes logging bans ineffective  is the difficulty  of enforcement  that under the current
tenure systems falls under the responsibility  of the government. The ineffectiveness  of such government
action may be reflected in efforts to shift enforcement  of illegal logging to importers, as manifested  by
the vice-president  of the Philippines  recently  urging Japan and Taiwan (China)  to stop buying illegally-
felled  timber from the Philippines  (see  Asian 7Imber,  1992a, p. 6).  The  problems  associated  with logging
'Dean (1992)  developed  a model which showed  that, in principle, log export  bans would result in less
harvest of logs than free trade conditions.  But, the more elastic the demand for logs as domestic  inputs,
the more likely the ban on log exports leads to overharvesting, ie.,underachieving  the environmental
target level of harvesting. Also, a high demand  elasticity reduces the likelihood  that the ban is welfare
improving. However, regarding the impact  of a ban on log harvest, Dean's model does not account  for
the increase in local processing capacity  and wasteful  use of logs in local processing.
2Capacity  may be a constraint in the short-run and, if it is binding, the rate of deforestation  will
probably be reduced for a period of time following  the adoption  of an export ban on logs.  However, as
the ban on log exports increases  the profitability  of local processing, in the medium to long-run domestic
processing capacity will be built to replace or even exceed the capacity  of the processors abroad that it
displaced.LZ
bans indicate  that in developing  countries there is a need to find policy instruments  that do not require
sophisticated  policing  but are largely self-regulating  (Cairncross,  1993). Restrictions  on logging  to reduce
the rate of deforestation  may serve only as a short-term measure. Their effectiveness  is likely to weaken
over time if  measures to  address production distortions, mainly land tenure and pricing, are not
implemented.
Import Bans and Boycotts. Bans  and boycotts  on tropical  timber imports  have become  a political
reality in both Europe and the United  States. While their benefits in terms of environmental  protection
are hotly debated, they  appeal to consumers  frustrated  by government  inaction  a;a convinced  that through
their buying habits they can discourage  tropical deforestation. Polls show that both in Europe and the
United States, consumers would purchase environmentally-friendly  products at even greater cost.3
However, consumers are not willing to pay more than 15% for environmentally  friendly products.
Johnson and Cabarle (1993) report that some 200 city councils in  Germany and 51%  of Dutch
municipalities  have banned the use of tropical timber.  It is also zeported that the Netherlands  proposes
to ban imports  of tropical timber as of 1995  (Economist, 1993).  In the United States, a number of states
and cities have banned or proposed a ban on the use of tropical timbers in public construction  projects.
Among them are the states of Arizona, California, and New York and the city of Minneapolis.
The effectiveness  of import bans and boycotts to reduce tropical deforestation  is questionable,
however. First, they could  depress the already  undervalued  tropical  forests making  them less competitive
against alternative  uses, such as agriculture. Second, import bans and boycotts influence  only a small
part, at most 20%, of the world's tropical  timber production. As mentioned  in the previous section, 80%
31n  the United  States, a cabinet  maker is reportedly  charging  an "ecology  surcharge"  on tropical  wood
products. The surcharge  aims  to increase  customers' awareness  and to support  sustainable-yield  projects.of tropical timber production is consumed in the producing countries. Third, if the Asian importers
(accounting  for over 50% of tropical  timber imports)  do not adopt similar policies, the influence  of any
import bans and boycotts will be greatly reduced. It is noteworthy  that the chairman  of the Indonesian
Wood Panel  Association  has reportedly  said that Indonesia  will  not be affected  by the anti-tropical  timber
campaigns  in Europe and the United States, as it has been expanding  its tropical timber exports  to Asian
and Middle-Eastern  countries (Asian 7lmber, 1993, p.4).  Fourth, bans and boycotts fail to address the
main causes of deforestation.  Moreover, the legal basis for one country imposing import bans on
products from another based on differences in environmental  standards  has been successfully  challenged
under international  trade agreements. The recent GAIT decision overruling  the US ban on imports of
Mexican  tuna has established an important  precedent in this context (Kulessa, 1992).
Export bans on logs and import bans and boycotts on tropical timber products, including  logs,
have different effects.  As noted earlier, export bans on logs do not reduce the overall demand for
tropical  timber; they shift the location  of log processing. Thus, with elastic  internal demand for logs as
inputs  and wasteful  processing, increases  in the rate of deforestation  are possible. Import  bans on tropical
timber products, including logs, do reduce the overall demand for tropical timber.  Thus, the rate of
deforestation  is expected  to be reduced, at least in the short-run. In the long-run, however, to the extent
import bans and boycotts  contribute  in lowering  the value of the standing  forest making alternative  uses
more profitable, and to the extent Asian importers  do not adopt  these  restrictions  and new markets in Asia
and the Middle East replace the ones imposing  the import restrictions, the impact of import bans and
boycotts  on the rate of deforestation  could range from a marginal  reduction  to an increase.
Primo Braga (1992) presented an analytical  framework  in which he evaluated  trade policies in
tropical hardwood and the environment. His results suggest that the use of trade instruments  to pursueA9
environmental  objectives may increase domestic resistance to external pressures devoted to fostering
global environmental concerns.  Furthermore, his analysis points out that a free trade policy cum
production  tax should provide the optimal  policy mix, not only in terms of efficiency  considerations  but
also with respect to the pursuit of environmental  objectives.
Eco-labeling or  Cerification  ProgrAms. Given the questionable effectiveness of bans and
boycotts,  there is a growing  movement  to use eco-labeling  programs to promote  tropical  timbers  produced
from sustainably-managed  forests. Eco-labeling  refers to certification  programs designed  to evaluate  the
performance of particular forestry operations.  They usually involve a label accompanying  a timber
product, stating whether the timber product comes from a sustainable  or well-managed  forest.  Eco-
labeling programs  have been fostered mainly by  European consumers'  concerns about tropical
deforestation, but are now expanding into the United States.  The European Community has been
developing  an eco-labeling  program  and supporting  legislation  for four years. The intention  is to establish
uniform criteria for a number of products and a single label which can be applied throughout  Europe,
replacing nationally  developed  labels.  In the United Kingdom, the World Wildlife Fund has started the
"1995 Club" to which 24 retailers  have committed  so far, with.  the objective  that all their timber products
will be from sustainable  sources. In Japan, demand  for wood from sustainable  sources presently barely
influences  the local market (Johnson  and Cabarle, 1993). All of these efforts emanate  from consuming
countries.  However, recently the African Timber Organization  (ATO) has proposed a regional eco-
labeling program for West and Central Africa.  This is an important example, because politically  it Is
important  that tropical timber producers develop  their own strategies  with regards to eco-labeling. The
ATO aims at the evolution  of a common  label to be used by all its members  under the description 'Bois
Africain d'origine controlee". The label will indicate  the forest category, the country of origin and thecompany's  name.'
Eco-labeling  programs  such as Rainforest  Alliance's  "Smart  Wood", Scientific  Certification
System's  "Green  Cross"  and the Insiltute  of Sustainable  Forestry's  "Pacific  Certified  Ecological  Forest
Products"  have  the objective  of promoting  good  forest  practices  and  sustainable  timber  production.  The
main  criteria  for these programs  deal with the concept  of "sustained  yield", meaning  that harvesting
should  not exceed  the forest's  growth  rate.'  Often  these  programs  set timber  production  levels  in order
to protect  water  quality,  biodiversity  and non-wood  forest  products. Certain  indicators  are chosen  and
when  a critical  level is reached,  timber  production  should  be significantly  reduced  or stopped  until the
indicators  show  a recuperation  in the ecosystem-  In addition,  eco-labeling  programs  are concerned  with
social  issues  in relation  to forest  management.  Most specify  criteria  for local participation  in project
planning,  employment  generation  and profit  sharing. After  a forest  is certified  as sustainable,  regular
inspections  by the certificating  organizations  follow,  usually  in association  with a local  research  entity.
Eco-labeling  programs  are new  and rather limited  in terms of their coverage  of world timber
production. Among  the problems  faced  by eco-labeling  programs,  issues  of financing,  coverage  and
compliance  merit special  attention. Eco-labeling  involves  costs and foregone  short-run  revenues  for
producers.  So  far, philanthropic  organizations  and  grants  have  paid  for most  of the costs  of eco-labeling
4ATO  defines  three categories  of forests: (a) plantations  and managed  forests; (b) forests  lacking
management;  and (c) forests  under  controlled  regeneration.
'The definition  of sustainability  is hotly  debated. Of issue  is how much  intervention  a forest  can
support  without  significantly  disturbing  the  biodiversity.  A workable  approach  is proposed  by the "Smart
Wood"  program. Two classifications  of forest  management  are proposed:  sustainably  managed  (rarely
achieved)  or well-managed  (more  commonly  achieved).  The latter  is easier  to define  and  certificates  can
be awarded  to companies  that pursue  good forest management  and are working  towards  sustainable
management.  In this  way  certification  can  begin  without  waiting  to resolve  the debate  over  sustainability.
As companies  achieve  sustainably  managed  criteria,  they  can  be re-evaluated.  Over  time  the criteria  can
be strengthened  on the basis  of the experience  gained.aL
programs. If these  programs  proliferate,  the current  sources  of funding  may  not be sufficient  to cover
these  costs. Timber  prices  will  have  to increase  and it remains  to be seen  how  much  extra  consumers
are willing  to pay for timber  products  from  sustainable  sources. Costs  and  foregone  short-run  revenues
due to eco-labeling  could be of particular  concern  to African  tropical  timber exporters  which have
relatively  few export  alternatives.
At issue is whether  eco-labeling  (certifying)  should  cover an individual  producing  firm or a
producing  country  as a whole. Despite  the complexity  and  considerable  effort  associated  with  certifying
an individual  producing  firm, certification  should  be on an individual  firm basis.  By doing so, the
sovereignty  issue is avoided.  Furthermore,  certification  standards  should be developed  for local
conditions;  that is, for different  sociological  and biophysical  conditions. This is because  different
producers  within  the same  country  may  face different  conditions.  The issue  of eco-labeling  should  be
seen more as a business-driven  decision.  Guaranteeing  validation  and overseeing  country-based
certification  standards  by governments  in the producing  countries  would  likely  undermine  the credibility
of eco-labeling  programs  for consumers  in importing  countries.
We turn  now  to the question  of compliance.  Eco-labeling  programs  in tropical  timber  should  be
consumer-driven,  market-based  schemes. Thus, participation  should  be on a voluntary  basis.  If
incentives  to subscribe  to these schemes  are strong enough,  importing  countries  should  not need  to
introduce  unilateral  legislation  discriminating  against  imports  of tropical  timber from unsustainable
resources.  Government  legislation  would be very resource and time consuming  and probably
unnecessary.  Moreover,  unilateral  legislative  imposition  of  eco-labeling  programs  could  be GATT-illegal-
an issue that is examined  later in the paper--and  could  lead to trade frictions  between  importing  and
exporting  countries.  Austria,  for example,  proposed  legislation  making  compulsory  the adoption  of eco-az
labeling in tropical timber products but as a result of protests the proposed legislation  was modified  to
make eco-labeling  voluntary and to include not only tropical but all timber products.
The success of eco-labeling programs introduced on a voluntary basis will depend on how
consumers react to them. 6 In particular, whether consumers  are willing to pay more for the sustainably
produced  timber products. Consumer  surveys  in Europe  have indicated  that consumers  are willing  to pay
more for environmental-friendly  products. For timber, the so-called "green  premium" is in the order of
5-15%.  However, even if consumers in Europe and the United States  were to show their preference  for
timbers coming from sustainably-managed  resources, the impact  of eco-labeling  may not be significant.
Earlier we saw (Table 3) that China, Japan, and South Korea account for a little less than half of the
world's tropical timber imports. Thus, only if Asian consumers  are willing  to show their preference  for
timber products from sustainably  managed  sources by paying more for them will the market for tropical
timber be significantly  affected.
If consumers in major Asian importing  countries do not show a preference  for certified timber
products, while consumers  in Europe and North America  do, large-scale  trade diversion  in tropical  timber
trade is likely to take place. Tropical  timber from what are deemed  to be unsustainable  sources will flow
to Asia while timber from sustainable  sources will be diverted into the United States and Europe. This
assumes  that not all tropical timber comes  from unsustainable  sources. Even in the extreme  case where
all tropical timber comes from unsustainable  sources, trade diversion is still likely to take place in the
event that Asian importers  do not express their preference  for certified timber products. In this extreme
case, the United States  and Europe will probably consume  very little or no tropical timber, while Asian
6This holds whether eco-labeling is  introduced on  a voluntary basis or  imposed by  unilateral
legislation.23
importers  may substitute  tropical for temperate  timber, absorbing  almost all tropical  timber exports. The
statement  made earlier that Indonesia  can substitute  Asian and Middle-Eastern  markets for European and
American  markets  is illustrative  of tl.is point. The rejection  of tropical  timber products  due to eco-labeling
in Europe  and the United States  would reduce the value of these  products and make them more attractive
for Asian importers.' It is true that the adoption  of eco-labeling  programs in European  countries is more
likely to affect timber exports from African  producers since Europe is the major timber trading partner
of Africa. However, Japan has been increasing  imports  of African  timber, particularly  from Gabon. So
significant  trade diversion could  take place even for African  timber.
Skepticism  about the effective  contribution  of ,co-labeling  also reflects the fact that most tropical
timber is consumed  locally. Thus, a significant  share of tropical  timber production  would not be directly
affected by eco-labeling in importing countries (even if all major importing countries, including  Japan
and other Asian importers, adopt eco-labeling  and consumers  in these countries  show their preferences
for certified timber). Once again, the impact of eco-labeling  may be a perverse one.  As the value of
timber from unsustainably-managed  forests in producer countries is reduced, the value of the forest
decreases, making alternative uses of the forest, such as agriculture, more profitable and thus may
contribute  to deforestation  along  the lines of the argument  developed  for import bans and boycotts  earlier.
An additional  problem  regarding eco-labeling  for tropical timber products can be that of false or
misleading  claims.  Cairncross (1993) reports a number of cases where the consumers' awareness of
environmental-friendly  products is exploited. She states  that "environmental  marketing  has rapidly  turned
'The assumption  here is that tropical, temperate and softwood  timber products have a high elasticity
of substitution,  at least in the long-run, and that there is a low elasticity of substitution  between timber
products and non-timber  products. In such a scenario, the rejection  of tropical timber in Europe and the
United States will increase prices of temperate and softwood timber products, in which case Asian
importers will substitute  the latter for tropical  timber products.24
out  to  be  a  morass" (Cairncross,  1993, p.  196).  Cairncross (1993) also  reports that  in  1991
Environmental Research Associates of Princeton, New Jersey, found that nearly 47% of consumers
dismissed environmental claims as "mere gimmickry".  What is important also to recognize is that
reported false  or misleading  claims  regarding  products seem to be relatively  much  easier to disprove than
clai;ns regarding  the sustainability  or not of a particular forest or the forestry management  of a particular
country or region.  This puts a  heavy weight in  the design of eco-labeling programs on gaining
consumers' confidence  in their claims.  This will be particularly important in voluntary eco-labeling
schemes.
In short, the effectiveness  of eco-labeling  programs is likely to depend on the *'ollowing  factors.
First, such programs should provide incentives  for compliance  by producing  countries. Such incentives
could be better prices and improved markets  for timber products from sustainable  sources.  At present
the "green premium" is only at the order of 5-15%, but producers will have also the incentive  to gain
market share.  In addition, sales could increase as tropical timber wins back some of the markets  taken
over by other timbers or timber substitutes.  Also, some tropical  timber bans imposed  by local authorities
in European countries and in the United States may be lifted. Few producing countries will make
investments  to  achieve sustainability  if the benefits associated with competing  land uses or financial
investrnents are  greater  than those associated with  sustainable forestry.  Second,  credible (and
manageable) systems would have to be developed to  track timber from the source to  the market.
Currently, logs from different sources are mixed in ports for exports and in sawmills for processing.
Third,  widely acceptable standards would have to  be  developed for  eco-labeling.'  The  current
proliferation of eco-labeling  programs based upon varying standards and verification  techniques seems
'At present there is no agreed  upon definition  of sustainable  forest management  which is the basis of
eco-labeling  programs.unworkable. Programs should provide evidence in ways that are credible, acceptable, affordable and
practical.  Environmentalists  tend to be suspicious of judgements  other than their own and producing
countries  tend to be suspicious  about attempts  by outsiders  to impose  stanidards.  It would appear sensible
therefore to  have representatives from consuming and producing countries represented within the
institution  setting  the eco-labeling  standards. 9 Fourth, on the producers side effective  land tenure systems
seem to be required.  Without them, verifying  sustainability  will be very difficult.  Moreover, without
legal titles and demarcated  boundaries, log producers will not likely be able to justify the investments
necessary  to be certified as a sustainable  source.  Fifth, public education  campaigns could be launched
both by governments and NGOs to present the issues to the public and allay fears of false claims.
Education  campaigns  could also target timber production and local people in timber producing  regions.
The success of eco-labeling  programs will depend crucially  upon the level of involvement  of producers
at all levels.
GA7T  and  Eco-Labeling.  Trade  policies are  "second-best'  instruments for  advancing
environmental  objectives  in forestry. As discussed  in the previous section, use of trade policies  may even
generate perverse results from an environmental  perspective in addition to their negative economic
implications. It is also worth noting that at present there is limited scope for GAIT-consistent  trade
restrictions to advance environmental  objectives.
GAlT-legality is not necessarily  a good indicator  of the economic  soundness  of any given trade
policy.  Yet, to the extent that the GAIT  provides the obvious forum for the debate of trade-related
environmental  measures, it is worth analyzing  the GAIT-legality of eco-labeling.
9Mhere  is also the need for creating  an inspection  entity and a forest audit system that can be seen as
impartial by all parties involved.Under the GATI,  consumption-related  standards are not prohibited as long as they are applied
in a non-discriminatory  fashion between domestic goods and imports.  For exa,mple,  a country may
restrict  imports of  fruits that  do  not  comply with  the standards for  pesticide residuals applied
domestically.  However,  differences  in production  and process methods  (PPMs)  are not usually  considered
justification for deviating from GATT obligations.  As noted by Sorsa (1992, p.  119), to allow trade
restrictions based on differences in PPMs "would undermine the capacity of countries to benefit from
their comparative  advantage."
The debate about eco-labeling  is in essence a debate about how to address an issue of PPMs.
Compliance  with eco-labeling  standards as a condition  for market access is clearly a non-tariff barrier
(NTB)  and, as such, GATT-illegal. Environmentalists  have argued  that such trade restrictions should  be
allowed  under a broad interpretation  of Article XX (the  General  Exceptions  to the GATE). Article XX(g),
for example,  establishes  that measures  designed  to foster the conservation  of exhaustible  natural resources
may be exempted  from GATI disciplines.
The outcome  of the US-Mexico  tuna dispute  indicated  that this broad interpretation  of Article  XX
will not be easily accepted as a defense in the case of countries trying to enforce their preferred PPMs
at an extraterritorial  level.  Furthermore,  the fact that Mexico  also invoked  Article IX (Marks of Origin)
in its successful  challenge  of the US import ban has been interpreted  as a sign that unilateral attempts  to
impose eco-labeling  by developed  countries will be contested  at GATT level by the affected  parties.
Eco-labeling,  even when imposed  unilaterally  by importing countries  simply as an instrument  to
foster consumer  awareness, will probably  be challenged  in the context of a strict interpretation  of GATT
principles. If  restricted to  tropical wood, for example, it can be  argued that such practices will27
discriminate  in favor  of temperate  wood producers. Furthermore,  the extraterritorial  application  of
standards  will revive  the debate  about  the treatment  of PPMs in the GATT  (not to mention  the usual
claims  of eco-imperialism).  It can be argued  that if eco-labeling  is introduced  on a voluntary  basis  by
importing  countries,  GAIT-legality  may  not be an issue. Still,  the question  of the effectiveness  of such
a measure  remains,  as noted  in the previous  section.
Summing  up, even  though  the GATT-legality  of eco-labeling  practices  in the case  of tropical
wood  has not yet been  formally  tested,  one can expect  that  they  will generate  additional  trade disputes
at the  multilateral  level. The challenge  for those  in favor  of such  practices  is to devise  labeling  programs
that  are both nondiscriminatory  and  manageable.
Rinl Remarks
Trade policies  have  often  been  identified  as an instrument/vehicle  for promoting  environmental
objectives  in tropical  forestry. The environmental  problems  in tropical  forest  use which  have  given  rise
to concern  arise  mainly  because  of inadequate  property  rights. Government  policies,  especially  the low
rents  collected,  are also to blame. It is argued  by environmentalists  that  the denial  of market  access  (in
the case  of import  bans)  or unilateral  discrimination  (in  the case  of eco-labeling)  will induce  'positive'
changes  in the behavior  of governments  and economic  agents. Environmentalists  also  tend to support
export restrictions  (e.g., log export bans) imposed  by producer  countries  as a way to foster better
conservation  practices.  As discussed  in this paper, all of these  trade restrictions  tend to depress  the
perceived  value  of tropical  timber  and consequently  may  have  a perverse  environmental  impact.28
It is well known  that trade policies  are inefficient  instruments  for correcting  domestic distortions.
In other words, they are poor instruments  with which to pursue environmental  goals.  Yet, if one were
constrained  to choosing  among  trade policies  to advance  these  goals, it seems that eco-labeling  holds  more
promise  for promoting sustainable  forestry than either bans imposed  by exporters  or importers.
Eco-labeling's  main strength  lies in its capacity  to discriminate  (through  market signals)  in favor
of timber produced under sound environmental  practices, in contrast to the indiscriminate  and perverse
impacts of bans and boycotts.  However, if imposed  unilaterally, even by all importing countries, its
effectiveness  will  be, to say the least, doubtful,  as Asian  consumers  may continue  to consider  lower prices
more important than sustainable tropical timber production.  It would lead to trade diversion and
potentially  perverse environmental  results, not to mention an increase in trade disputes at GATI' level.
Thus, eco-labeling should be introduced on a voluntary basis.  If incentives to subscribe are strong
enough, importing countries should not need to introduce  unilateral legislation  to discriminate against
tropical timber from unsustainable  sources.
Accordingly,  eco-labeling  should be pursued at a multilateral  level (e.g., through discussions  in
the context of the International  Tropical  Timber Organization),  and "fairness"  considerations  dictate that
eco-labeling  should also incorporate  temperate timber products.' 0 Moreover, it should be used not as
a  "stick" but as a  "carrot" to entice proper environmental  practices.  By addressing the issue at a
multilateral  level, countries  would  be able to minimize  the problem  of trade diversion. At the same time,
standards would be determined  in a cooperative  manner, diminishing  the risk of trade conflicts.
10 NGOs  in Europe start recognizing  this latter point and begin lobbying  for sustainable  management
of non-tropical  timber.The multilateral solution is particularly appealing because producers as co-participants in the
process would more likely approach  eco-labeling  not as a non-tariff  barrier but as an instrument  by which
to  capture the  rents  associated with prevailing environmental concerns in  the  developed world.
Accordingly,  the main challenge  for those who support eco-labeling  is the design of programs that can
be financed and managed at a multilateral level and that entice signatories to enter into commitments
which will indeed lead to sustainable  forest use.3iQ
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